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THE EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY EXCEPTION TO THE
INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
TONI HAHN DAVIS*

I.

INTRODUCTION: A SPECIAL ALLIANCE

Throughout American history, Native Americans have had a
special relationship with the federal government. Indians were
originally viewed by many European missionaries and commentators as primitive, yet pristine and innocent-free from "distinctions of rank and wealth."' Before America's conquest, Indians
had no contact with Christianity and were therefore deemed innocent of "infidelity" and of spurning the word of God. 2 In the
decades preceding the American Revolution, the English government had an unusual association with the Indians: the English
dealt directly with the Indian nations, even over the heads of their
own colonists. For example, the English negotiated and made
treaties with the Indian nations regarding lands, and even tried to
protect Native Americans from encroaching white settlement.
The special alliance between the British and the Indian
nations served as a precedent for the federal government created
by the U.S. Constitution. Besides the Indian nations, no other peoples were singled out as a "foreign nation" within the boundaries
of the United States. One legal scholar calls the Indian tribes a
"jurisdictional anomaly."' 3 There has been no other group about
whom the American government has displayed such long term
ambivalence and guilt.
Throughout American history, there has been a remarkable
double standard regarding Indians and blacks. Despite the fact
that North American colonists held some Indian slaves, they never
doubted that the majority of Indians were and should remain free
and could even be assimilated as equal citizens after a long period
of being "civilized." 4 Blacks, on the other hand, were deemed
* Presently Tutor in Law of the Yale Law School Graduate Programs, 1992-93 and
1993-94, and Doctoral Candidate at the Yale Law School; L.L.M., 1992, Yale Law School,
New Haven, Connecticut; J.D., 1985, University of Connecticut School of Law, Hartford,
Connecticut; M.S.W., 1970, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California; B.A.,
1968, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
1. DAVID B. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE, 167 (1986).
2. Id. at 168.

3. See Barbara A. Atwood, Fighting over Indian Children: The Uses and Abuses of
JurisdictionalAmbiguity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1989) ("Indian tribes in the United
States are a jurisdictional anomaly.").
4. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 177.
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inherently inferior and incapable of the responsibilities of citizenship. By the time of American independence, the vast majority of
blacks were slaves, whereas virtually all Indians were free.5 Both
Europeans and early white Americans were especially sensitive to
the plight of the Native American and expressed a continuing
sense of guilt over the coercive dispossession and anticipated
"extinction" of numerous tribes. Chief Justice Taney, in Dred
Scott v. Sandford,6 summed up this double standard when he compared the population of imported Africans and their descendants--"considered ... [an] inferior class of beings"'-to the Indian
race-"uncivilized ... yet a free and independent people, associ-

ated together in nations or tribes, and governed by their own
laws."" Accordingly,

[t]hese Indian Governments were regarded and treated
as foreign Governments ....

Treaties have been negoti-

ated with them, and their alliance sought for in war ....
[I]t has been found necessary, for their sake as well as our
own, to regard them as in a state of pupilage, and to legislate to a certain extent over them .... 9
Despite this underlying sense of alliance, the policies of the
American government toward the Indian tribes have changed
considerably at various times in American history. One legal
scholar notes that while current federal policy aims at "enhancing
tribal identity and autonomy," much of prior federal policy was
aimed at assimilation and "termination of tribes and tribalism."' 0
II. APPLICABLE LEGISLATION
Over the centuries much legislation was enacted, including
the United States Constitution, which elaborated or embodied the
special relationship between the United States government and
the Indian nations. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution reserved to Congress the power to regulate commerce with
Indian tribes and "through this and other constitutional authority,
Congress ha[d] plenary power over Indian affairs[.]"" "[T]hrough
statutes, treaties, and the general course of dealing with Indian
5. Id. at 180.
6. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
7. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-05 (1856).
8. Id. at 403.
9. Id. at 404.
10. Atwood, supra note 3.
11. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1901(1) (1988).
footnotes citing 25 U.S.C. will refer only to section numbers.

All subsequent
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tribes, [Congress] assumed the responsibility for the protection
and preservation of Indian tribes and their resources[.]"'" Congress found that there was "no resource that is more vital to the
continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in
protecting Indian children .... ."'3
A.

THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT

1. Purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act
As a result of this "special relationship between the United
States and Indian tribes and their members and the Federal
responsibility to Indian people," 14 Congress enacted the Indian
Child Welfare Act (hereinafter "the ICWA" or "the Act") 15 in 1978
"to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote
the stability and security of Indian tribes and families .... In
order to promote this policy, Congress established in the Act "minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from
their families" and sought to ensure "the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture ....
Congress enacted the ICWA to enhance tribal identity and
autonomy after finding that a very high percentage of Indian families were "broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their
children from them by nontribal public and private agencies"1 8
and that a high percentage of these children were "then placed in
non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions .... .19 In
MississippiBand of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,20 the Supreme
Court noted that studies "presented in the [1974] Senate hearings
showed that 25 to 35% of all Indian children had been separated
12. § 1901(2).
13. § 190103).

14. § 1901.

15. §§ 1901-1963.

16. § 1902.
17. Id. Examples of the minimum standards are: 1) the preference given to members
of the child's extended family, other members of the Indian child's tribe, or other Indian
families in any placement in state court under § 1915(a); 2) the efforts that must be made to
provide remedial and rehabilitative programs to prevent the breakup of the Indian family
prior to foster care placement or termination of parental rights to an Indian child under
state law under § 1912(d); and 3) the necessary evidentiary burden of beyond a reasonable
doubt in the termination of parental rights that continued custody of the child is likely to
result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child under § 1912(a) and (f).
18. § 1901(4).
19. Id. See H. R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7530-34 (stating the legislative purpose, background, and standards for
the ICWA).

20. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
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from their families
and placed in adoptive families, foster care, or
21
institutions."

[I]n the state of Minnesota, for example, one in eight
Indian children under the age of 18 was in an adoptive
home, and during the year 1971-1972 nearly one in every
four infants under one year of age was placed for adoption. The adoption rate of Indian children was eight
times that of non-Indian children.2 2
In addition, the Supreme Court noted that testimony indicated
that Indian children placed in non-Indian homes often developed
"serious adjustment problems" during adolescence. 3
Congress also found that "administrative and judicial bodies
[of the various states] have often failed to recognize . . . the cul-

tural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and
families."'2 4 The two purposes of the Act-to promote "the 'best
interests of Indian children' and the

. .

. 'stability and security of

Indian tribes and families'-are intertwined" with the underlying
belief that "it is in the best interest of an American Indian child
that the role of the tribal community in the child's life be
protected.

25

2. Definitions in the ICWA
Operation of the ICWA is triggered by a child custody proceeding, the subject of which is an Indian child. "Child custody
proceeding," as that term is defined and used in the Act, refers to
proceedings for foster care placement, termination of parental
rights, preadoptive placement, and adoptive placement. 6 The
plain language of the Act provides for only two exceptions to the
types of proceedings covered by the Act: 1) custody proceedings as
part of a divorce decree, and 2) delinquency proceedings.
Neither of these proceedings involves the removal of an Indian
child from parental control and protection.
An "Indian child" is defined as "any unmarried person who is
21. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989).
22. Id. at 33.
23. Id.
24. § 1901(5).
25. Donna J. Goldsmith, Individual vs. Collective Rights: The Indian Child Welfare
Act, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 1, 4 (1990). See also In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile
Action, 635 P.2d 187, 189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) ("The Act is based on the fundamental
assumption that it is in the Indian child's best interest that its relationship to the tribe be
protected." (footnote omitted)).
26. § 1903(1).
27. Id.
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under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or
(b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe[.]"'28 The "Indian child's

tribe," as that term is defined and used in the Act, refers to "(a) the
Indian tribe in which an Indian child is a member or eligible for
membership or (b), . . . the Indian tribe with which the Indian
child has the more significant contacts[.]" 29 "Indian tribe," as

defined in the Act, refers to "any Indian tribe, band, nation, or
other organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided to Indians by the Secretary because
of their status as Indians ....

The ICWA definition of an "Indian child" and its requirement
that a child's tribal identity be used as a basis for custody decisions
may well raise claims that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fifth Amendment has been violated. The Equal Protection Clause
guarantees that all individuals will be afforded fair treatment in
the exercise of fundamental rights and will not be classified on the
basis of impermissible criteria.31 The basis for such an equal protection claim may be found in Palmore v. Sidoti.3 2 In Palmore,the

United States Supreme Court ruled that state courts violate the
Equal Protection Clause if they change a child's custody solely on
the basis of racial considerations. 3 This whole issue of recognizing
racial considerations is extremely controversial. Since the status of
a child as an Indian under the ICWA is dependent upon tribal
membership, which in turn depends on racial heritage, the ICWA
gives sanction to racial considerations in just such custody matters.
It could be argued, however, that equal protection claims with
regard to the ICWA protections on the basis of tribal membership
fail in light of the unique status of the Indian tribes as self-gov28. § 1903(4).
29. § 1903(5).
30. § 1903(8).
31. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. If the federal government classifies individuals in
a way which would violate the equal protection clause, it will be held to contravene the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See generally Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499 (1954). Classifications on the basis of such criteria as race "are subject to the most
exacting scrutiny; to pass constitutional muster, they must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest and must be 'necessary . . . to the accomplishment' of their
legitimate purpose." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (citations omitted).
32. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
33. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984). The United States Supreme Court held
that the custody change on the basis of race did not pass constitutional muster under the
Equal Protection Clause. Id.
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erning political nations 34 and because the tribal classification is
35
used to remedy proven past discrimination.
"Parent," as that term is defined and used in the Act, "does
not include the unwed father where paternity has not been
acknowledged or established[.]" ' 36 Therefore, when a child is born
out of wedlock to a non-Indian mother and an Indian father, unless
the Indian father acknowledges or establishes his paternity, he is
not considered a "parent" of the child. Thus, the ICWA provides a
clear definition of an Indian child, a parent, and the child custody
proceedings to which it applies.
The Act's limitation on the definition of "paternity" to exclude
unwed fathers whose "paternity has not been acknowledged or
established '37 complies with Supreme Court decisions emphasizing protection of parental rights of biological parents only if they
have established or acknowledged their paternity. For example,
in Stanley v. Illinois, 38 the United States Supreme Court described
Peter Stanley, an unwed father, as a man who had "sired and
raised ' 39 his children, and as a result, had a "cognizable and substantial" interest in retaining their custody.4 ° The Court thus
found that Stanley had a constitutional interest in his relationship
34. Chief Justice Marshall writing for the Court in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) outlined the conception of Indian tribes as "domestic dependent
nations" under the "protection" of the United States. Id.
35. Courts have taken race into account in deciding whether a constitutional violation
has occurred and in formulating constitutional remedies. See North Carolina State Bd. of
Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971); Local 28 Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assoc. v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
Federal Communications Comm'n, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
36. § 1903(9). See In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 667 P.2d 228, 232-33 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1983) ("[I]n the case of a child born out of wedlock to a non-Indian mother, until...
the putative Indian father acknowledges or establishes paternity, . . . ICWA [is] not
applicable"); In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Okla. 1985) (stating that
the ICWA is inapplicable when the unwed father "failed to lay legal claim to the child").
37. § 1903(9). The Act does not define a particular method of acknowledging or
establishing paternity. Courts have "looked to state law to determine whether an alleged
father of an Indian child has acknowledged or established paternity." In re Adoption of A
Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 935 (N.J. 1988) (citations omitted). "Furthermore,
the ICWA's definition of parent looks to state or tribal law to determine the status of
adoptive parents, and also makes the determination of whether a person has legal custody
of a child a question of state or tribal law." Id. (citations omitted).
We conclude, therefore, that Congress intended to defer to state or tribal law
standards for establishing paternity, so long as these approaches are permissible
variations on the methods of acknowledging and establishing paternity within
the general contemplation of Congress when it passed the ICWA, and provide a
realistic opportunity for an unwed father to establish an actual or legal
relationship with his child.
Id. (citations omitted).
38. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
39. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
40. Id. at 652.
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with his children equal to the interest of other parents. 4 ' Further,
in Caban v. Mohammed,42 the Court recognized Caban's past custodial relationship and accordingly afforded constitutional protection to the unwed father.4 3
On the other hand, in Quilloin v. Walcott,4 4 the Court found

that Quilloin had never consistently supported the child and had
never sought actual or legal custody of the child. 45 The Court
denied constitutional protection to Quilloin, noting that "the State
was not foreclosed from recognizing this difference in the extent
of commitment to the welfare of the child,

' 46

because he had

manifested only limited interest in his children. Under these
three cases (Stanley, Caban, and Quilloin),establishment of paternity and parental rights by past custodial relationship, legal
acknowledgment, and emotional involvement with the child is
critical to the unwed father's rights.
A more recent case in which the rights of an unwed father
were at issue is Lehr v. Robertson.47 The United States Supreme
Court emphasized in Lehr that the biological relationship between
a parent and a child is of constitutional significance because it
offers biological parents a unique opportunity to develop critical
emotional bonds with their children. 48 However, the Court then
denied parental rights to the unwed father who had failed to
establish a substantial relationship with his child. 49 The Supreme
Court reasoned that a state may require that an interested putative father develop a relationship with his child in order to establish parental rights. 50 In a similar manner, several state courts
have refused to apply the ICWA because the Indian putative
father had failed to acknowledge or establish his paternity, as
'
required in the Act's definition of "parent."' 5
Moreover, despite clear language in the ICWA limiting its
application only to parents who have acknowledged or established
paternity, a judicially created exception without express statutory
41. Id. at 658.
42. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
43. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979).
44. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
45. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
46. Id.
47. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
48. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 258, 262 (1983).
49. Id. at 265.
50. See id. at 248.
51. In re Adoption of A Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925 (NJ. 1988); In re
Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985); In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 667
P.2d 228 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
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foundation-the existing Indian family exception-has nonetheless
been successfully invoked to defeat application of the Act when
the father has properly established or acknowledged his paternity.12 The existing Indian family exception-an exception based
on the notion that the ICWA will only be applicable if an Indian
child is removed from an "existing Indian family unit ' 53 or "Indian
home or culture" 54-is now commonly employed by both courts
and parties. How this exception has been employed, its effects on
the ICWA, and the broader implications of its use will be discussed
later in this article.
3.

The Structure of the ICWA

The ICWA provides a jurisdictional, procedural, and substantive structure governing child custody proceedings in an attempt
to correct the failures of administrative and judicial bodies of the
state and nontribal public and private agencies.
a. Jurisdictional Provisions of the ICWA
The jurisdictional structure of the ICWA is a dual scheme,
based on the residence or domicile of the Indian child. Pursuant
to the Act, disputes concerning Indian children who reside or are
domiciled within their tribal reservations are the exclusive responsibility of the tribe.55 However, in the case of Indian children who
do not reside or are not domiciled on their tribe's reservation,
state courts may exercise jurisdiction concurrent with tribal
courts.56 State courts must refer the dispute to the appropriate
tribal court unless good cause is shown for the retention of state
court jurisdiction, or unless either parent objects to the transfer, or
unless the tribal court declines the transfer. 57 But if the threshold
requirements-that it is a child custody proceeding and that the
matter involves an Indian child-are fulfilled and the state court
retains the case, the substantive and procedural provisions of the
52. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982) (finding that the ICWA
did not apply because the child was never a part of an Indian family); Claymore v. Serr, 405
N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1987) (stating that the ICWA was inapplicable because the child was not a
member of an existing Indian family).
53. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175-76.
54. Claymore, 405 N.W.2d at 653-54.
55. § 1911(a).
56. § 1911(b). See also Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,
36 (1989) ("Section 1911(b)... creates concurrent but presumptively tribal jurisdiction in
the case of children not domiciled on the reservation ... .
57. § 1911(b).
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ICWA still apply and the tribe has the right to notice58 and to
intervene in the state proceedings.59 It is in the context of a state
court proceeding that the existing Indian family exception is
raised.6 °
b.

Substantive Provisions of the ICWA

The ICWA provides a substantive structure which Congress
intended to further promote the goals of the Act.. In briefest summary, the Act states that "In any adoptive placement of an Indian
child under State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence
of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with 1) a member of
the child's extended family; 2) other members of the Indian child's
tribe; or 3) other Indian families."' Similar preference shall be

given for foster care or preadoptive placement. 62 Such preferences may not exist under state law. Further, the ICWA mandates
that "[a]ny party seeking.., foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under State law shall...
[make efforts] to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and

[shall satisfy the court] that these efforts have proved unsuccessful."'6 3 State laws without ICWA applicability do not require simi-

lar efforts.
c.

Procedural Provisions of the ICWA

In ICWA proceedings, parental rights cannot be terminated

without evidence "beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of

the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in
58. § 1912(a). Violation of the notice provisions may be cause for invalidation of the
proceedings under section 1914.
59. § 191 1(c).
60. See, e.g., Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 659 (S.D. 1987). See also supra notes 52-53
and accompanying text.
61. § 1915(a). The United States Supreme Court, in Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield, called this provision "the most important substantive requirement
imposed on state courts...." 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989). In the recent case In re Oscar C., Jr.,
neglect proceedings were brought concerning Indian children. 559 N.Y.S.2d 431 (N.Y.
Farn. Ct. 1990). The court noted that if there is "clear and convincing evidence that
continued custody.., by [the Indian] father is likely to result in their serious emotional or
physical damage [the court may] remove them from his care." Id. at 433. The court stated
that if the children could not be returned to their father, "the ICWA establishes that a
preference be given to a member of the Indian child's extended family [for foster care]."
Id. at 434. The children were placed with their maternal grandmother, a Native American.
Id. at 435.
62. § 1915(b).
63. § 1912(d).
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serious emotional or physical damage to the child."6' 4 State laws
require "clear and convincing evidence" for terminating parental
rights.6 5 Most state laws permit the temporary removal of children from their families and placement in foster care on a preponderance of the evidence standard. However, the ICWA provides
that a child may not be placed in foster care unless there is "clear
and convincing evidence" that "serious emotional or physical
damage" to a child is likely to result if the child remains with its
parents or Indian custodian.66
Legislative history of the ICWA indicates that the facts
presented to Congress prior to the enactment of the ICWA
included: 1) "The decision to take Indian children from their natural homes is, in most cases, carried out without due process of
law[;]" 2) "Many cases do not go through an adjudicatory process
at all, since the voluntary waiver of parental rights is a device
widely employed by social workers to gain custody of children[;]"
and 3) "Because of the availability of the waivers and because a
great number of Indian parents depend on welfare payments for
survival, they are exposed to the sometimes coercive arguments of
welfare departments. '67 As a result, the ICWA contains numerous
procedural provisions that are intended to offer additional protections to Indian children, families, and tribes.
Provisions of the Act regarding consent to termination of
parental rights-a parent's consent, for example, executed in writing and recorded before a judge-are designed to increase the
likelihood that a consent was voluntarily given. 8 For involuntary
proceedings in state court, notice must be given to the child's parent or Indian custodian and the child's tribe. 9 Consent to a foster
care placement may be withdrawn at any time.7 ° In any voluntary
proceeding for termination of parental rights or adoptive placement, the consent of the parent may be withdrawn for any reason
64. § 1912(f).
65. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982). In a South Dakota case,
In re N.S., the trial court stated that "'by clear and convincing evidence it is necessary for
the child's physical and mental well-being that the parental rights ... be terminated...
[and] no lesser restrictive alternative than termination... [is] available ... to protect the
minor child ....
474 N.W.2d 96, 99 (S.D. 1991) (quoting dispositional order). The South
Dakota Supreme Court stated that under section 1912(f), there must be "evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt that 'the continued custody of the child is likely to result in... damage
to the child.'' Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)).
66. § 1912(e).
67. See H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7530, 7533.
68. § 1913(a).
69. § 1912(a).
70. § 1913(b).
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prior to the entry of a final decree, and may be withdrawn after
the final decree in cases involving fraud or duress.7 ' Once again,
state laws vary considerably but they are generally much less
favorable to the natural parents than are the ICWA provisions.
4. Applicability of the ICWA
As previously indicated, the goal of the Act is to safeguard not
only tribal interests, but the interests of Indian children and their
families as well. Since the substantive and procedural provisions of
the ICWA are intended specifically to be protective of Indian children, families and tribes, the provisions are often substantially different from state provisions. As a result, it is the applicability of
the ICWA that often becomes the dispositive issue in cases involving Indian children in child custody proceedings. If the Act is
applicable, the particular procedural, jurisdictional, and substantive structure outlined in the ICWA of 1978 must be followed. If
provisions of the Act are not observed, an Indian child, the parent
or Indian custodian of an Indian child and/or the child's tribe may
petition the court to invalidate a foster care placement, a termination of parental rights, an adoption, or a preadoptive placement by
showing a violation of the Act.72
III.

THE JUDICIAL EXCEPTION TO THE ICWA
A.

DIFFERING OPINIONS

Despite the congressional goals to enhance tribal identity by
enactment of the ICWA, state courts frequently avoid its application. By denying the ICWA's applicability, the particular procedural, jurisdictional, and substantive provisions are avoided in
making foster care placements and adoptions. In the same way, a
foster care placement, adoption, or termination of parental rights
made pursuant to the Act can be invalidated by challenging the
application of the ICWA. This challenge is made by using a judicially created exception: the existing Indian family exception
(hereinafter "the exception"). A considerable number of American jurisdictions recognize this judicial exception to the Act. Contrary to the plain language of the Act, the exception allows an
Indian child who is the subject of a child custody proceeding to
which the ICWA applies to be exempted from the Act.
What is this judicial exception? How has it been employed by
71. § 1913(c), (d).
72. § 1914.
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both courts and parties? What are the effects of such an exception
on the ICWA and its goals? And what are the broader implications
of this judicially created exception?
As mentioned earlier, the existing Indian family exception is
based on the notion that the ICWA will only be applicable if an
Indian child is removed from an "existing Indian family unit" or
"Indian home or culture." When there is no "existing Indian family" from which an Indian child is being removed, proponents of
the exception argue, the ICWA is inapplicable. This argument is
made despite the fact that the two threshold requirements for
applicability of the ICWA-l) that the matter involves an Indian
child, and 2) in a child custody proceeding-are fulfilled, and
despite the fact that there is no language in the Act which indicates removal from an Indian family as a requirement.
The Act itself states:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this
Nation to protect the best interests of Indian children and
to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and
families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or
adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of
Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian
tribes in the operation of child and family service
programs.7 3
The proponents' claim is based on this language and similar
passages in the ICWA, from which they conclude that the underlying goals of the ICWA focus on an Indian child being removed
from an Indian family. Therefore, when a court sustains the
claimed existing Indian family exception because there is no
existing Indian family, home, or culture, ICWA provisions do not
govern, its intended protections and purposes are no longer operative, and, instead, state law governs.
The opponents of the existing Indian family exception argue,
for their part, that the existing Indian family exception is directly
contrary to the purposes and goals of the ICWA. The opponents of
the exception state that the goals and purposes of the Act specifically include protections for the Indian tribe and Indian child as
well as the Indian family. They assert that the provisions of the
73. § 1902.
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ICWA provide for only two exceptions-I) custody proceedings as
part of a divorce decree, and 2) delinquency proceedings-neither
of which states that an Indian child must be removed from an
Indian family to be protected by the ICWA.
B.

EMPLOYMENT OF THE JUDICIAL EXCEPTION

It is against the backdrop of the procedural, jurisdictional, and
substantive components of the ICWA that the existing Indian family exception is raised. The scenarios in which a party claims or a
court raises the existing Indian family exception to the application
of the ICWA are surprisingly diversified. Indeed, the exception is
raised by both Indian and non-Indian parties and is used to
attempt to defeat placements in either Indian or non-Indian families. Courts, too, have employed the exception in similarly varied
circumstances. A careful examination of some of the successful
and unsuccessful attempts to invoke the judicial exception is
enlightening with respect to its general effect on the ICWA and on
the goals of Congress. If, as opponents to the exception argue, the
existing Indian family exception thwarts the goals of the ICWA and
permits manipulations that do not in any way promote the interests of the Indian families, children, and tribes, a closer look should
be given to the Act itself, its language, its provisions and its
purposes.74
The Supreme Court recently addressed questions concerning
the ICWA for the first time. As mentioned earlier, the existing
Indian family exception is raised to challenge the application of
the Act only in the context of a state court proceeding. The
existing Indian family exception was not at issue in Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield.75 The sole issue in
Holyfield was whether, under the ICWA, the tribal court had
exclusive jurisdiction or concurrent jurisdiction with the state
court. Nevertheless, subsequent lower court decisions and party
claims both defeating and supporting the existing Indian family
exception have relied on its ruling. 7"
Holyfield concerned the status of illegitimate twin babies
whose unmarried parents were enrolled members of the Choctaw
tribe and residents and domiciliaries of the Choctaw Reservation
74. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the goals of Congress in
enacting the ICWA, it is important to note that tensions between and among the interests of
the Indian child, the Indian family, and the Indian tribe are exceedingly difficult to resolve.
75. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
76. See, e.g., In re S.C., 833 P.2d 1249 (Okla. 1992) (recognizing the limitations of
Holyfield holding).
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in Mississippi. The parents deliberately drove to a town in Harrison County some 200 miles away for the birth of the twins. Both
parents then executed consent-to-adoption forms on behalf of a
non-Indian couple, the Holyfields.7 7 However, some time later,
the Choctaw tribe filed a motion to vacate the adoption decree
entered by the county court. The tribe claimed that exclusive
jurisdiction over the matter was vested in the tribal court under
the ICWA, not the state court system using the substantive ICWA
provisions, since both parents were domiciliaries and members of
the Choctaw tribe reservation.7 8 Since the ICWA failed to define
the word "domicile," the Court had to decide whether the domicile of the twins was in Harrison County or the Choctaw reservation to see if, pursuant to the jurisdictional structure of the ICWA,
the adoption should have been the exclusive responsibility of the
tribal court.7 9
The Court found that although the twins had never been
physically present on the reservation, had been "voluntarily surrendered" ° by their parents, and had been promptly relinquished
to adoptive parents, their domicile was still the tribal reservation." The Court emphasized that "[t]ribal jurisdiction under [the
Act] was not meant to be defeated by the actions of individual
members of the tribe ....
2 The Holyfield Court ruled that the
twins were domiciled on the reservation, and the individual
Indian parents could not defeat the ICWA's provisions for exclusive jurisdiction to the tribal court if the parents were domiciled
within a reservation.8 Surprisingly, Holyfield has been relied
upon by courts and parties both to support and reject the existing
Indian family exception, which has been invoked in proceedings
involving Indian children and families who are living off the reservation and who are, therefore, subject to state court jurisdiction
concurrent with that of the tribal court.
1.

Supportfor the Exception-Scenario 1

The first scenario in which the existing Indian family exception has been raised involves challenges by unwed Indian fathers
to the adoption of their illegitimate children. 4 In fact, the case
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 37-38 (1989).
Id. at 38.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 53.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49.
Id.
Claymore v. Ser, 405 N.W.2d 650, 653-54 (S.D. 1987) (finding the ICWA
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most notable for the existing Indian family exception involved an
unwed Indian father challenging the adoption of his illegitimate
child. In the 1982 Kansas case, In re Adoption of Baby Boy L.,85 an
infant was born out of wedlock to a non-Indian mother and an
Indian father duly enrolled as a member of the Kiowa tribe. The
mother of the infant executed a consent to an adoption "specifically directed and limited to" the non-Indian adoptive parents.8 6
The adoptive parents fied a petition that the court declare the
father unfit and terminate his parental rights, and also filed a petition for adoption."7
The state court entered an order granting temporary care and
custody to the adoptive parents. Notice of the adoption proceedings was personally served on the father, who at the time was
incarcerated. The father claimed that the ICWA applied, and that
in accordance with the Act, the father's tribe had a right to participate in the proceedings. The tribe moved to intervene. However,
the trial court denied the father's claim of the applicability of the
Act and denied the tribe's motion to intervene "on the grounds
that the ICWA did not apply to [the] proceedings. ""8
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court reasoned that Congress
never intended the Act "to dictate that an illegitimate infant who
has never been a member of an Indian home or culture, and probably never would be, should be removed from its primary cultural
heritage and placed in an Indian environment over the express
objections of its non-Indian mother."' 9 The court stated:
In this case Baby Boy L. is only 5/16ths Kiowa Indian, has
never been removed from an Indian family and so long as
the mother is alive to object, would probably never
become a part of the [father's] or any other Indian family.
While it is true that this Act could have been more clearly
and precisely drawn, we are of the opinion that to apply
the Act to a factual situation such as the one before us
inapplicable since the Indian child resided with the non-Indian mother and was never part
of an "Indian family" and concluding that an Indian child must be part of an existing Indian
family before the Act can apply); In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 605-09 (Mo. App. 1986)
(finding that the ICWA did not apply since the unwed Indian father and non-Indian mother
never lived as a family); In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Okla. 1985)
(stating that the ICWA is inapplicable when the unwed Indian father never had custody and
had not acknowledged or established paternity and when the child never resided in an
Indian family and had a non-Indian mother).
85. 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
86. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 172 (Kan. 1982).
87. Id. at 173.
88. Id. at 174.
89. Id. at 175.
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would be to violate the policy and intent of Congress
rather than uphold them. 0
Further, the court pointed out that the non-Indian mother
had made it clear that if the child was placed for adoption under
the terms of the Act, she would revoke her consent and would
again take custody of her child; in that event, the child would not
have been in an Indian home either.9 ' Since the "underlying
thread" of the entire Act was, according to the Baby Boy L. court,
a concern with the "removal of Indian children from an existing
Indian family unit and the resultant breakup of the Indian famly,"92 the court concluded that the ICWA was inapplicable and
upheld the trial court's denial of the Indian father's claims.93
As previously indicated, a number of jurisdictions have followed the Kansas Supreme Court's promulgation of the existing
Indian family exception to the applicability of the ICWA where
there has been a voluntary relinquishment of an illegitimate
Indian child by its non-Indian mother. In the 1990 case of S.A. v.
E.J.P. ,1 the Alabama Civil Appeals Court agreed with the Kansas
court and applied the existing Indian family exception because the
illegitimate child had lived primarily with her non-Indian mother
or her non-Indian great-aunt and great-uncle, the "mother and
father had never married and had never lived together," "[tihe
father had never supported the mother or the child," -[t]he child
[had] minimal contact with her father" and "no involvement in
tribal activities," and "[t]he father had never exercised his parental responsibilities .. .
In this scenario, "where the child has few ties to its Indian
heritage," courts have employed the existing Indian family exception to narrow the application of the ICWA. In these cases, it is the
Indian father who is trying to invoke the use of the ICWA to undo
the unilateral acts of the non-Indian mother, usually one placing
the child for adoption under state law. Underlying the courts' use
of the exception is the fact that the mother is non-Indian and the
child is illegitimate and has been voluntarily relinquished for
adoption by the mother. The unwed father has generally failed to
support the child or the mother. The contacts between the child
and the father and the child and the father's tribe have usually
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 176.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 188.
571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
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been minimal. In fact, the courts place emphasis on the father's
failure to exercise his parental responsibility, despite the father's
acknowledgment of paternity or establishment of paternity.96
In these circumstances, courts have understood the framers of
the Act to have intended to maintain the Indian family, Indian
children, and Indian tribal interests in the narrowest sense: only
where there has been a recognizable Indian family. 97 The courts
generally emphasize that when no coercive state activities removing an Indian child are involved, the private adoptive placement is
voluntary and the removal is not breaking up an existing Indian
family. The non-Indian mother's background is viewed, as the
Baby L. court stated, as the child's "primary cultural heritage."9
Indeed, courts underscore the small percentage of Indian genes in
the Indian child. For example, the Baby Boy L. court emphasized
that the infant was "only 5/16ths Kiowa." 99 By employing the
exception, courts can avoid invalidating the child custody arrangements made under state law.' 00
2. Criticisms of the Exception
Other jurisdictions, however, have criticized the use of the
existing Indian family exception. 10 The California Court of
Appeals, in In re Crystal K.,10 2 refused to employ the exception
and held that the Act applied to an Indian child of a non-Indian
96. See id.; Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1987) (upholding the termination
of the unwed father's rights and adoption by the stepfather and emphasizing that the nonIndian mother provided sole care of the child, and that the father, although he
acknowledged his paternity, never exercised parental responsibilities); In re Adoption of
Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
97. See Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650, 653 (S.D. 1987) (stating that there was no
existing "Indian family" losing an Indian child when the child had a non-Indian mother and
never resided in an Indian family); In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Mo. App. 1986)
(stating that neither the relationship between the non-Indian mother and the seven-yearold mentally handicapped child nor the relationship between the Indian father and the
child could constitute an Indian family).
98. In re Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175.
99. See also S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187, 1188 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990) (noting that the
father is 1/8th Cherokee); In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973,974 (Alaska 1989) (noting
that the father was 1/32 Chickasaw and the infant only 1/64 Indian).
100. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
101. See In re Adoption of A Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 937 (N.J. 1988)
("We disagree with... other courts that have limited the scope of [§ 1914] to cover only
parents who at one time or another had actual physical custody of an Indian child."); In re
Custody of S.B.R., 719 P.2d 154, 156 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that the ICWA applies in
the adoption proceeding of an Indian child who had never lived in an Indian family because
"[i]t
is in the Indian child's best interest that its relationship to its tribe be protected.")
(citations omitted); In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489 (S.D. 1990) ("[I]t is
incorrect, when assessing ICWA's applicability to a particular case, to focus only upon the
interests of an existing family" because "[s]uch a practice fails to recognize the legitimate
concerns of the tribe that are protected under the Act.") (citations omitted).
102. 276 Cal. Rptr. 619 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 1991) (quoting § 1903(1)).
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mother and Indian father who had divorced some years before.
The mother had remarried and two years later petitioned the
court to sever the biological father's parental rights. The issue
before the court was whether the standards for termination of
parental rights were those of state law or the ICWA, a tougher
standard designed to protect the Indian parent. The court refused
to sustain the claim of the existing Indian family exception raised
by the non-Indian parent since, according to the California Court
of Appeals, the plain language of the Act indicated that the matter
fell within the ICWA. The provisions of the ICWA, the court
pointed out, defined a child custody proceeding as including" 'any
action resulting in the termination of the parent-child relationship,' o103
placing the proceeding squarely within the Act. The
court held that the ICWA applied and that no judicially-created
exceptions should be permitted: "Limiting the Act's applicability
solely to situations where nonfamily entities physically remove
Indian children from actual Indian dwellings deprecates the very
links-parental, tribal and cultural-the Act is designed to
preserve.104

Another California court recently criticized the existing
Indian family exception with respect to a much older child than
the child in the Kansas Baby Boy L. case. Unlike Baby Boy L., this
was a child who had actually lived in a non-Indian household for
many years.10 5 In 1991, the California Court of Appeals, in In re
Adoption of Lindsay C.,106 reviewed a stepfather's adoption petition for a seven-year-old child born out of wedlock to a non-Indian
mother and Indian father. The court argued that "Holyfield has
raised new questions regarding the continuing viability of Baby
Boy L. and its progeny.... Baby Boy L. may have given inappropriate weight to the wishes of the family [as opposed to those of
the tribe]."'' 7
The Lindsay C. court pointed to the change in the South
Dakota Supreme Court's decisions regarding the existing Indian
103. In re Crystal K., 276 Cal. Rptr. 619, 623 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 1991) (quoting
§ 1903(1)).
104. Id. at 625. See also In re Junious M., 193 Cal. Rptr. 40, 46 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (stating that "[t]he language of the Act contains no such exception to its applicability"
and refuting the trial court's decision on the basis that the child had developed no Indian
identification).
105. In light of the Baby Boy L. court's emphasis on the fact that the child was not
raised in an Indian home, this case presents an even stronger challenge to the Kansas court
rationale, since the child had lived in a non-Indian household for seven years by the time
the matter reached the final court determination.
106. 280 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1991).
107. In re Adoption of Lindsay C., 280 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (1991).
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family exception in Claymore v. Serr and In re Adoption of Baade
following Holyfield. The Lindsay court noted that in Claymore,
the South Dakota Supreme Court had found the Act inapplicable
when the custody proceeding involved an illegitimate child who
had never lived in an Indian home; however, in Baade, the South
Dakota court had stated that ICWA applies any time an "'Indian
child' is the subject of a 'child custody proceeding' as those terms
08
1
are defined by the Act.'

The Lindsay C. court proceeded to hold that the ICWA
applied to an illegitimate Indian son of an Indian father and a nonIndian mother. The Lindsay C. court emphasized the Holyfield
Court's statement that Congress's concern over the placement of
Indian children in non-Indian homes was based in part on evidence of the detrimental impact on the children themselves in
placements outside their culture. 109 The court relied on the
Supreme Court's holding that the twins in Holyfield assumed the
domicile of their Indian mother, regardless of whether they were
"voluntarily surrendered" by their mother:
"Tribal jurisdiction under [the Act] was not meant to be
defeated by the actions of individual members of the
tribe, for Congress was concerned not solely about the
interests of Indian children and families, but also about
the impact on the tribes themselves of the large
numbers
110
non-Indians."
by
adopted
children
of Indian
The California court held that the Act applied to the adoption
of Lindsay C., since: 1) "Lindsay [was] an Indian child within the
meaning of the Act;" 2) the matter was a proceeding which fell
within the Act; 3) "[the proceeding did] not fall within one of the
two specific exclusions under the Act (i.e., divorce or delinquency
proceedings ...
[;]" 4) there did not appear to be any other basis for

exclusion[;]" 5) the Act's application "advance[d] the stated purposes of the legislation[;]" and 6) applying the ICWA was "in keeping with the tenor of Holyfield, which stresse[d] consideration of
not only the wishes of the parents, but the well-being and interests
108. Id. at 199 (citing Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650, 653 (S.D. 1987) and In re
Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1990)). The Lindsay C. court noted that only
three years after Claymore and after Holyfield, the Baade court clarified the Act's
application when it stated that the ICWA's application to a case was contingent "only upon
whether an 'Indian child' was the subject of a 'child custody proceeding' as those terms are
defined by the Act." Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 198-99 (citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,
49-51 (1989)).
110. Id. at 199 (quoting Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30,
49 (1989)).
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'
of the child and the tribe." 11
In accordance with the ICWA,
therefore, notice of the proceedings had to be given to the
tribe." 2
Courts refusing to invoke the existing Indian family exception
emphasize that the plain language of the Act provides no exceptions other than custody proceedings related to divorce or juvenile
court proceedings. In In re Adoption of A Child of Indian Heritage, 1 3 the New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed with the Baby
Boy L. rationale that "the ICWA does not apply where an unwed
mother voluntarily relinquishes her child for adoption shortly after
birth."1 4 The court interpreted Baby Boy L. and other state court
decisions as finding that when "no coercive state activities are
involved, assuming a private adoption placement is truly voluntary, and the removal is not breaking up an Indian family,.., the
concerns addressed by the Act [are] not implicated ... .""' The
Child of Indian Heritage court stated that "[w]e disagree with this
interpretation of the Act because it posits as a determinative juris' 6
dictional test the voluntariness of the conduct of the mother." "
The court argued that under the plain language of the Act, the
conduct of the mother is not a jurisdictional test of its coverage.
Further, "[t]he effect on both the tribe and the Indian child
...is
'' 17
the same whether or not the placement was voluntary.

Finally, while an unwed mother might have a. legitimate
and genuine interest in placing her child for adoption
outside of an Indian environment, if she believes that
such a placement is in the child's best interest, consideration must also be given to the rights of the child's father
and Congress' belief that, whenever possible, it is in an
Indian child's best interests to maintain a relationship
with his or her tribe." l8
In the same manner, in the case In re NS.,"1 9 the South
Dakota Supreme Court emphasized that there was no statutory
requirement that a child be born into an Indian home or commu111. In re Adoption of Lindsay C., 280 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
112. Id. at 201. The court noted, however, that there was nothing in its opinion which
was "meant to suggest [whether] the tribe should intervene or, if it [did], that it [would]
necessarily prevail on the positions it takes." Id.
113. 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988).
114. In re Adoption of A Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 930 (N.J. 1988).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citation omitted).
119. 474 N.W.2d 96 (S.D. 1991).
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nity before the ICWA applied. 120 According to the court, "No
amount of probing into what Congress 'intended' can alter what
Congress said, in plain English, at 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). '1121 The

ICWA was meant to address the interests of Indian tribes and
Indian children, not just the interests of parents. To permit the
existing Indian family exception to defeat the applicability of the
ICWA would sidestep the Act's protections of these interests.
South Dakota Supreme Court Justice Sabers concurred in In
re N.S., 2 2 emphasizing that Holyfield "authoritatively established
the principle that the provisions of ICWA are to be strictly construed and applied."' 2 3a Further, Justice Sabers asserted that in

Baade, "this court acknowledged that pre-Holyfield state court
cases like [Claymore and Baby Boy L.] are now doubtful authority,
and that [the] ICWA has effect even when the Indian child has
never been raised in an Indian home.'1

24

All three cases (Baade,

Claymore, and Baby Boy L.) involved an illegitimate Indian child
living with a non-Indian mother, yet it was only in Baade that the
provisions of the Act were strictly construed, thwarting the application of the existing Indian family exception. As in Baade, the In
re N.S. court strictly construed the Act, stating that the ICWA
terms are unambiguous on its face and "when a court ignores the
clear provisions.., in reliance on what the court believes the legislature must have meant to say, the court is improperly engaging in
judicial lawmaking."' 25 Moreover, in In re Crystal K. ,16 a California appellate court noted that it would be contrary to the interests
of Indian children, families, and tribes to assume that the cultural
links Congress intended to protect were found solely within
"actual Indian dwellings. "127

120. In re N. S., 474 N.W.2d 96, 101 n.6 (S.D. 1991).
121. Id. (emphasis in original).
122. 474 N.W.2d 96 (S.D. 1991).
123. In re N.S., 474 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Sabers, J., concurring specially).
124. Id. (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 100 n.6. In In re Junious M., the court stated that:
We note that the trial court predicated its decision not to apply the Act in part
on its determination that the minor had developed no identification as an Indian.
The language of the Act contains no such exception to its applicability, and we
do not deem it appropriate to create one judicially.
193 Cal. Rptr. 40, 46 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (citation omitted). See also In re Custody of
S.B.R., 719 P.2d 154, 156 (Wash. 1986) ("The [maternal grandparents petitioning for custody] assert that the Act does not apply where the child had never been a part of any Indian
family relationship. Again, the language of the Act contains no such exception, and the
[grandparents] have presented no compelling reason to create one.") (citations omitted).
126. 276 Cal. Rptr. 619 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
127. In re Crystal K., 276 Cal. Rptr. 619, 625 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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3. Scenario 2
Another frequent but very different scenario in which the
existing Indian family exception is raised involves Indian mothers
who had previously arranged to have their illegitimate children
adopted by non-Indian parents under state law. These mothers
will often later, in some cases years later, 28 attempt to invalidate
the earlier adoption granted in. accordance with state adoption
regulations. The basis on which they seek to invalidate the earlier
adoption is that the ICWA provisions should have governed the
adoption. In the first scenario, it will be recalled, some courts
were seeking to avoid invalidating an adoption by use of the
existing Indian family exception. Similarly, in this scenario, some
courts also seek to avoid invalidating an adoption by use of the
existing Indian family exception, despite the fact that the natural
mother is an Indian. Whereas in the first instance, it is the unwed
Indian father who invokes the ICWA to invalidate the unilateral
act of the non-Indian mother, in the second scenario, it is the
unwed Indian mother who invokes the ICWA to invalidate her
own unilateral act.
In In re Adoption of TR.M., 29 for example, an Indian mother
arranged to have her illegitimate child adopted by a non-Indian
couple. When the Indian mother changed her mind one year
later, she and the tribe sought to invalidate the adoption on the
grounds that "the . . . adoption proceeding and [the trial court]
judgment [were] contrary to the ICWA[.]"'13 0 The court, however,

found that the child had been given up for adoption shortly after
birth and was never part of an existing Indian family. 13 Thus, the
court suggested that because of the existing Indian family exception, the ICWA did not apply. The court noted that "except for
the first five days after birth, [T.R.M's] entire life of seven years to
date has been spent with her non-Indian adoptive parents in a
non-Indian culture ....
[W]here the child was abandoned to the
adoptive mother essentially at the earliest practical moment after
childbirth . . ., we cannot discern how the subsequent adoption

proceeding constituted a 'breakup of the Indian family.'

"132

128. Although the Indian mother in In re Adoption of T.R.M. began to challenge the
adoption within a year, at the time of the court decision, the child was seven years old and
had lived with the adoptive parents since she was a week old. 525 N.E.2d 298, 302 (Ind.

1988).
129. 525 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988).
130. In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 302 (Ind. 1988).

131. Id. at 303.
132. Id.

1993] EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY EXCEPTION TO THE ICWA

487

The TR.M. court seemed to base its holding and use of the
existing Indian family exception on the lack of time the child had
spent with her Indian mother and the great amount of time she
had spent with her non-Indian adoptive mother, apparently paying little heed to the fact that her mother was Indian. The Baby
Boy L. court, on the other hand, in the first scenario, had viewed
the fact that the child's natural mother was non-Indian as critical
to its determination that there was no existing Indian family. The
child in Baby Boy L., like the child in TR.M., had spent only a
matter of days with the natural mother. Because T.R.M. had spent
so little time with her Indian mother, however, the court simply
indicated that it was not an existing Indian family, which was a
necessity for ICWA application, according to this court.
Another Indiana court, also reviewing a case in which the
mother was Indian, agreed that the Act covers the removal of an
Indian child from an existing Indian family. Unlike the TR.M.
court, however, the court in In re D.S. 13 3 stated that "where the
mother is a Native American Indian, the mother and child, at least
presumptively for purposes of initiating ICWA inquiries, constitute
an 'Indian family.' "1134 Thus, the In re D.S. court would have
applied the existing Indian family exception-which would prevent application of the ICWA if the Indian child did not come from
an existing Indian family-if the mother had not been Indian.
However, since the court presumed there was an Indian family,
the court stated that the ICWA applied to the Indian mother and
her child and held that, on remand: 1) the tribe must be given
notice; 2) the standard of parental termination is beyond a reasonable doubt, and 3) "the trial court... [must] inquire of the expert
witnesses as to their specific qualifications related to the placement of Native American Indian children."' 35
In a recent Washington state case, In re Adoption of Crews,'
the court was also faced with an Indian mother who had consented
to adoption of her child. As in the previous two Indiana cases
(TR.M. and D.S.), the court accepted the principle of the judicial
exception-that unless the Indian child was removed from an
existing Indian family, the ICWA does not apply-and then struggled to determine whether an Indian family "existed" for purposes
of the existing Indian family exception. 1 ' As in D.S., the mother
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

577 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. 1991).
In re D.S., 577 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ind. 1991).
Id. at 575-76.
825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992).
See In re Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d 305, 308-10 (Wash. 1992).
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was a young, single Indian woman. Ms. Crews, the mother, had no
contact with an Indian tribe, and, in fact, only discovered the
extent of her Indian background once she decided to challenge
138
the earlier adoption of her child.
The mother and the baby's father, a non-Indian, decided to
place the infant for adoption with an agency. In the parents' interviews with the adoption service, there was some mention of the
mother's possible Indian heritage, but the adoption service
assumed that the child was not an Indian and that, therefore, the
ICWA did not apply. 139 As a result, the adoption proceeded under
state law. When the mother later changed her mind about the
adoption and brought suit, she alleged that the ICWA should have
governed and that the adoption had, therefore, not been in compliance with the Act. 140 The Washington Supreme Court found
that the ICWA did not apply because the infant had not been
removed from an existing Indian environment and noted further
that the mother had voluntarily consented to a non-Indian adoption. 14 The Crews court cited the United States Supreme Court's
ruling in Holyfield to support its conclusion that the "ICWA is not
applicable when an Indian child is not being removed from an
Indian cultural setting, the natural parents have no substantive
ties to a specific tribe, and neither the parents nor their families
' 42
have resided or plan to reside within a tribal reservation.'
Justice Andersen concurred with the court's holding, but
argued that the ICWA did not apply because the threshold
requirements for the Act had not been met. 43 He read the Act to
apply to any Indian child, "regardless of ... previous exposure to
tribal culture and traditions."'1 44 Justice Andersen noted that the
Act applied to "the child's membership in or relationship with a
tribe-a political entity whose sovereignty is recognized by our
federal government[.]"' 145 According to Justice Andersen, under
the Act, the Crews infant had not been an "Indian child" (a biological child of a member of a tribe), at the time of the termination of
parental rights.14 6 Justice Andersen disagreed with the court's use
of the existing Indian family exception, prescribing application of
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 307.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 310.
In re Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d at 310.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 313.
Id.

1993] EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY EXCEPTION TO THE ICWA

489

the ICWA only if "the cultural awareness, tribal affiliation or lifestyle of the birth family meets some judicially fashioned level of
'Indian-ness.' "147
4. Effects of the Exception in Scenario 2
In all these cases involving Indian mothers, courts have fashioned such levels of "Indian-ness" to try to manipulate their use of
the existing Indian family exception. In all three cases (Crews,
D.S., and TR.M), the courts have struggled to determine whether,
even though the child's mother was an Indian, there was no
existing Indian family from which the child was removed. The
result is that in the application of the existing Indian family exception, when the mother is an Indian challenging an adoption under
state law, there is no uniformity or predictability in the
determination.
Although the ICWA clearly defines an Indian child by its
membership or eligibility for membership in a tribe or the membership of its biological parent in a tribe 148 in a manner common
to other federal acts, 149 and requires an Indian father to come forward to lay legal claim to the child by acknowledging or establishing his paternity, 150 these courts' employment of the existing
Indian family exception becomes a second litmus test for "Indianness." That is, although the Act is quite clear about the crucial
definition of an Indian child based on tribal membership, these
courts attempt to introduce such notions as: 1) ties to the tribe, 2)
Indian cultural setting, and 3) length of time living in an Indian
home--effectively adding a new requirement or redefining an
"Indian child." There are, however, no clear lines or demarcations to these notions, and stereotypes, prejudices, and biases can
quickly enter into the determination. As shown, this test is not
only fuzzy and indeterminate, but it also has no explicit foundation
147. In re Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d at 312.
148. See § 1903(4).
149. Several federal eligibility standards for Indian services and programs are based on
tribal membership in a federally recognized tribe. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1462 and § 1452 of
the Indian Financing Act.
150. See § 1903(9). See also In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 667 P.2d 228 (Ariz.
1983). The In re Appeal in Maricopa County court distinguished its holding from In re Baby
Boy "in which the court found that the Act did not apply even where the Indian father
acknowledged paternity." Id. at 233 n.5. The Arizona court emphasized that
[T]he Act does not attempt to preserve a child's right to its Indian heritage
under all circumstances. Congress has limited the Act's coverage to members of
only those Indian tribes which qualify under the ICWA definition of "Indian
tribe." Nor does the Act apply to a child of an Indian if the child is not a member
of a tribe or not eligible for membership in a tribe.
Id. (citations omitted).
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in the Act. Moreover, the Alaska Supreme Court in In re Adoption
of TN.F.'5 1 suggested that the application of an "Indian family"
requirement by the TR.M. court
effectively deprived both the Indian mother and her
Tribe of the protections set out in the Act. It would seem
that the adoption in TR.M. was exactly the type of scenario in which Congress sought to impose federal procedural safeguards in order to protect the rights of the
152
Indian parents and their tribe.
Thus, reliance on a requirement that the Indian child be part of an
Indian family for the Act to apply also undercuts the interests of
Indian tribes and Indian children themselves.
5. Scenario 3-ntra-FamilyDisputes
The existing Indian family exception has also been invoked in
situations in which the adoptive family is the extended Indian family. This particular scenario has been labeled "intra-family disputes." In these cases, the adoptive family raises the existing
Indian family exception, claiming that the ICWA is not required
since the Act's alleged purpose was to remedy
the removal of
1 53
Indian children from their cultural settings.
In A.B.M.. v. M.H.,154 the biological Indian mother urged the

Alaska Supreme Court to revoke her consent to adoption of her
child by her sister and brother-in-law pursuant to the ICWA. The
adoptive parents, however, argued that because the Act was
intended to remedy agency bias resulting in the removal of Indian
children from their cultural settings or families, the Act was not
55
applicable since they were the child's extended Indian family.'
According to the adoptive parents, the child's adoption by members of her "extended family" would not deprive her of the exposure to Indian cultural or social values that the Act was designed to
safeguard. 156
While the Alaska court noted that one of the primary purposes
of the Act was to preserve the child's ties to Indian culture or
151. 781 P.2d 973 (Alaska 1989).
152. In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 977 (Alaska 1989).
153. See In re Custody of S.B.R., 719 P.2d 154, 156 (Wash. 1986) (finding that "[t]he
language of the Act makes but two exceptions" but does not include an exception for intrafamily custody disputes); In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d at 977 (stating that while one of
the primary purposes of the Act is to preserve the child's ties to Indian culture, a judicial
exception to the Act on that basis alone could not be justified).
154. 651 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1982).
155. A.B.M. v. M.H., 651 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Alaska 1982).
156. Id.
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social values, the court stated that it would not "creat[e] a judicial
exception to the Act's coverage on [that] basis alone."' 57 The
Alaska court explicitly declined to follow a Montana court's interpretation that the ICWA was not intended to cover internal family
disputes between a child's non-Indian mother and Indian paternal
grandparents.'3 8 According to the A.B.M. court, the Montana
court's holding was contrary to express provisions in the Act.' 59
This is because there was no language in the Act regarding exceptions for custody disputes within the extended family or distinctions based upon whom the adoptive or foster parents would be.' 60
The A.B.M. court pointed to explicit language in the Act
which excluded only "custody disputes resulting from divorce proceedings between parents of an Indian child and placements of
61
Indian children resulting from juvenile delinquency actions.'
The court noted that "[i]t is clear, then, that there were certain
internal family disputes which Congress intended to except from
the provisions of the Act. These exceptions were clearly expressed
and we find no compelling basis for implying any others."' 6 2 The
court concluded that pursuant to the ICWA, the child was to be
returned to the natural mother, and that the adoptive parents
163
could challenge the return of custody to the biological mother.
The adoptive parents, according to the Act,
must prove that such return is not in the child's best interests by showing (1) that remedial and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian
family have been implemented without success and (2)
that such return of custody is likely to result in serious
harm to the child. This final element must be shown
beyond a reasonable doubt and must be established by
164
the testimony of qualified expert witnesses.

157. Id. at 1173.
158. Id. at 1173 n.6. The basis of the Montana court's holding in In re Bertelson was
that the ICWA "is not directed at disputes between Indian families regarding custody of
Indian children; rather, its intent is to preserve Indian culture [sic] values under
circumstances in which an Indian child is placed in a foster home or other protective
institution." In re Bertelson, 617 P.2d 121, 125 (Mont. 1989).
159. A.B.M., 651 P.2d at 1173 n.6.
160. Id. at 1173.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1175.
164. A.B.M., 651 P.2d at 1175 (citation omitted).
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6. Scenario 4-Surrogacy
The existing Indian family exception has been raised in
another intra-familial matter-in the highly unusual case of a surrogacy arrangement. In In re Adoption of TN.F, 65 the Supreme
Court of Alaska was reviewing an action to set aside an Indian
child's adoption on the basis that the adoption had violated the
ICWA. In this case, a non-Indian woman ("the adoptive mother")
was unable to have children with her husband of sixteen years, a
1/32 Chickasaw Indian. The adoptive mother's sister, a married
non-Indian woman with four children of her own, agreed to be
artificially inseminated by her sister's husband. 6 Soon after
T.N.F.'s birth, custody of the infant was relinquished to the adoptive mother and her husband, T.N.F.'s biological father. 6 7 The
surrogate mother and her husband signed written consents, notarized in California where they lived, to the adoption of T.N.F. by
the adoptive mother pursuant to Alaska laws, where the adoptive
mother and her husband, T.N.F.'s biological father lived. The
adoptive mother and her husband, T.N.F.'s biological father, filed
a petition to adopt T.N.F., sending notices to the surrogate mother
and the Chickasaw tribe. 16 8 The Alaska Superior Court granted
the adoption and held that the "ICWA [was] inapplicable because
the parental rights of the only Indian involved in the proceedings
[T.N.F.'s biological father] were not modified."' 69
However, two years later the surrogate mother changed her
mind about the adoption and filed a motion to vacate the adoption
decree on the basis that the ICWA was applicable and that her
consent to the termination of her parental rights was invalid
because it was not recorded in accordance with section 1913(a) of
the ICWA. 17 0 She argued that as the biological parent of an Indian
child, the provisions of the ICWA applied to her. She also noted
that there was no requirement that the petitioning parent be an
Indian. 17 Further, the surrogate mother argued that the child fell
within the Act's definition of an Indian child, since T.N.F. was a
member of the Chickasaw tribe and was also the biological child of
the adoptive mother's husband.' 72 The adoptive mother and her
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

781 P. 2d 973 (Alaska 1989).
In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 974 (Alaska 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d at 975.
Id. at 975-76.
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husband, T.N.F.'s biological father, for their part, argued that the
existing Indian family exception should apply-that T.N.F. was
born to a non-Indian mother and had never been part of an Indian
family--and that the ICWA had been inapplicable. 173 They
argued that the termination of the mother's and her husband's
rights, as well as the adoption procedure, had been properly executed under state law. Further, the result of applying the Act to
this case-returning the infant from the adoptive mother and her
husband, T.N.F.'s biological father, to the surrogate motherwould be to disrupt an Indian family, not to protect one, one of
74
Congress' goals in enacting the ICWA.1
In In re Adoption of T.N.F., however, the court refused to use
the existing Indian family exception as a judicially created exclusion to the Act's coverage.1 75 Instead, the court held that the Act
applied. Relying on Holyfield, the court asserted that Congress
had enacted the ICWA seeking not only to protect the interests of
individual Indian parents but also to protect the interests of Indian
tribes, communities, and Indian children. To sustain an Indian
family exception would, the court stated, "undercut the interests
of Indian tribes and Indian children" in general, even though it
might also work against the desires or interests of an Indian individual in this case.' 76 The court based its rejection of the existing
Indian family exception on
serious policy reservations concerning the creation of
judicial exceptions to the plain language of ICWA ....
Moreover, these judicially-created exceptions to the coverage of ICWA are somewhat suspect in light of the Act's
purpose of imposing federal procedural safeguards. State
courts must be particularly hesitant in creating judicial
exceptions to a federal act which was enacted to counter
state courts' prejudicial treatment of Indian children and
communities.

77

As a consequence, state courts ought to be particularly hesitant about creating judicial exceptions in these circumstances:
"[T]o utilize a judicially created 'Indian family' exception would
173. Id. at 976.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 977-78.
176. In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d at 977.
177. Id. at 977-78. See also Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S.
30, 45 (1989) ("Indeed, the congressional findings that are a part of the statute demonstrate
that Congress perceived the States and their courts as partly responsible for the problem it
intended to correct.").
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be to enter onto a slippery slope which threatens to exclude the
very type of cases Congress had in mind when it adopted the
Act.' i7 The court rejected the existing Indian family exception to
the ICWA raised by the Indian father and his wife, but concluded
nevertheless that the adoption decree could not be challenged
179
because the statute of limitations had run.
Justice Compton, concurring in the court's decision, joined
with the court in rejecting the existing Indian family exception
since it "could lead too easily to chicanery which would defeat the
very purpose of the Act.'1 8 0 However, Justice Compton did not
agree with the court "that the non-Indian... may avail herself of
the protections of the Act to further purposes which have nothing
to do with furtherance of Indian welfare, so emphatically determined by Congress to be in need of protection."''
He reiterated
the "special relationship between the United States and Indian
tribes[,]" as well as the "[f ]ederal responsibility to Indian people."'8i 2 According to Justice Compton, "The principal malefactor
8 3
is the non-Indian and non-Indian agency, public or private.'
Justice Compton "recognize[d] that [his] construction of 'parent'
to include only a biological Indian parent may be open to the same
criticism that has been leveled against the 'Indian family' exception ....,,4 Indeed, Justice Compton's construction of the word
"parent," to include only a biological Indian, has no grounding in
the plain language of the Act. By excluding the rights of nonIndian parents of an Indian child from the provisions of the ICWA,
he is undercutting the interests of both the tribe and the child,
since those interests and resulting ICWA protections rest on the
fact that the child is an Indian child, not on the "Indian-ness" of
the parent.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Having examined judicial responses to the existing Indian
family exception, what general conclusions can be drawn? The
Indian Child Welfare Act was enacted by Congress to enhance the
identity and autonomy of the Indian nations with whom the federal government has long had a special alliance. The virtues or
178. In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d at 978.
179. Id. at 981.
180. Id. at 982 (Compton, J., concurring).

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. In re Adoption of T.N.F., P.2d at 982.
184. Id. at 984.
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faults of the Act as a whole are beyond the scope of this paper.
Still, a review of the successful and unsuccessful attempts by courts
and parties to invoke the judicially created existing Indian family
exception in order to avoid ICWA applicability suggests that use of
the exception should cease.
From the text of the ICWA, the legislative history and hearings that led to its enactment, and the Supreme Court's review of
the ICWA in Holyfield, it is clear that Congress was concerned
about the rights of Indian children, Indian families, and Indian
communities vis-a-vis states and their courts: "More specifically,
its purpose was, in part, to make clear that in certain situations the
state courts did not have jurisdiction over child custody proceedings."'11

5

Contrary to this purpose, the existing Indian family

exception has been used to evade applicability of the Act and to
confine a variety of cases concerning Indian children, their families, and tribes in the state courts under state law.
In the scenario involving the non-Indian mother and the
Indian father, the use of the existing Indian family exception narrows the ICWA's applicability by requiring that arbitrary criteria
be met that deprive Indian children, Indian fathers, and Indian
tribes of the protections offered by the Act. The unwed father's
claim to the child is already defined by the statutory limitation
which requires his establishment or acknowledgment of paternity.
Yet he is unprotected by the Act against the non-Indian mother's
unilateral actions when courts employ the exception to negate the
application of the ICWA.
In the scenario involving the Indian mother and the nonIndian father, the use of the existing Indian family exception has
also resulted in a manipulation that does not promote the interests
of Indian children, families, or tribes. The Act applies to the
Indian child on the basis of his tribal membership or the tribal
membership of his biological parent. Instead of relying on the
Act's clear definition of the Indian child, the courts in this particular scenario have been reduced to a search for "Indian-ness" or
"'actual Indian dwellings" in an attempt to avoid application of the
Act. Fashioning levels of "Indian-ness" thwarts Congress' policy to
enhance the Indian community.
Underlying the enactment of the ICWA was the Congressional
concern about coercive state action by state officials, social work185. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 45 (1989) (emphasis

in original).
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ers, courts, and adoption agencies. Yet the judicially created
exception is itself a coercive state activity that undermines the federal legislation. The judicial exception to the Act may well be
another version of the state action described in the ICWA: "judicial bodies have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards
prevailing in Indian communities and families. ' 186 One state, at
least, seems to have moved in the right direction. South Dakota
court rulings in the last half-decade have changed decisively from
use of the existing Indian family exception in Claymore to rejection of it in Baade and In re N.S.
Congress' belief that it is in the child's best interest to maintain its relationship to the tribe is also defeated by the avoidance of
the ICWA protections. This is because the thwarted ICWA protections include provisions that support the Indian child's relationship
to the tribe. Further, it has been discovered that psychological difficulties often surface late in the development of Indian children
placed in non-Indian homes. This problem of confused identity,
which was one of the factors that led Congress to enact the ICWA,
would obviously not be remedied by avoidance of the ICWA protections. In fact, the claim that there is no existing Indian family
can be misleading or even deceptive. After all, if the Act were
applicable and the exception denied, an Indian family might be
strengthened or even created as a result of the provisions of the
ICWA. The child might, instead of being placed with a non-Indian
couple, be placed with his own Indian uncle or grandparent as
envisioned by Congress. It may well be that if use of the judicially
created existing Indian family exception were to cease, adoption
agencies, state officials, social workers, and even the courts might
faithfully apply the Act, thereby decreasing the needless and
destructive litigation that often arises from later challenges to the
placement of a child.

186. § 1901(5).

